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CROSSING BORDERS: A TRIPS-LIKE 
TREATY ON QUARANTINES AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
Police officers with guns cannot make people obey a quarantine.             
In order for this to work, it has to be collaborative. They have to      
trust the government.1 
INTRODUCTION 
n the spring of 2009, the emergence and spread of a new influenza, 
H1N1, better known as the “swine flu,” raced rapidly around the 
globe, scaring, infecting, and killing.2 China, having experienced a se-
rious outbreak of SARS only seven years prior, responded vigilantly by 
using extreme measures, which arguably infringed on basic human 
rights.3 News stories surfaced in the United States about perfectly 
healthy foreigners in China forced into quarantine for multiple days due 
to minor coughs, runny noses, slight temperatures, or even after showing 
no symptoms at all.4 For example, during this period a school trip con-
sisting of twenty-one students and three teachers from a Maryland pri-
vate school turned into a week-long quarantine in China simply because 
of one feverish passenger on the group’s flight from the United States.5 
All of the students and teachers on the trip were free of flu symptoms.6 
Public health is traditionally a national responsibility.7 Governments 
are responsible for running their own health care systems, managing 
                                                                                                             
 1. Josh Gerstein, Obama Team Mulls New Quarantine Regulations (Aug. 5, 2009, 
4:12 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0809/25814.html. 
 2. See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil, Jr., W.H.O. May Raise Alert Level as Swine Flu 
Cases Leap in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009, at A9. 
 3. Donald G. McNeil, Jr. & Sharon Lafraniere, China Presses Quarantine Against 
Flu, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2009, at D8. 
 4. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, Caught in China’s Aggressive Swine Flu Net: 
Quarantine Measures Keep Cases Down But Virtually Imprison Healthy Travelers, 
WASH. POST, May 29, 2009, at A1. After landing in China, medical officials boarded 
Miguel Gomez’s plane, and with a temperature that was only .3 degrees above normal, he 
was deemed a public health threat and rushed by ambulance to a quarantine facility. He 
was found not to be ill, but spent three days quarantined in an infectious disease ward 
nonetheless. He did not see any uncovered faces the entire time. His meals were pushed 
through a small hole. Doctors in biohazard suits sampled his blood, swabbed his throat, 
and took his temperature every few hours. Id. 
 5. Daniel de Vise, China Quarantines Teens, Teachers from Md., WASH. POST, May 
28, 2009, at B3. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PATIENTS’ RIGHTS VS. THE 
PROTECTION OF PATIENTS 1 (2004). 
I 
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hospitals, adopting public health legislation, deciding on ethical stan-
dards of medical personnel, and approving the use and control of medi-
cine.8 However, many health problems cannot be contained within na-
tional borders, such as the spread of infectious disease.9 International 
cooperation to help prevent the spread of infectious disease began in the 
mid-1800s.10 Early cooperation was mainly to protect “civilized nations” 
from tropical diseases.11 Then, in 1948, the World Health Organization 
(“WHO”) was created in order to assist all countries in preventing and 
fighting epidemics.12 
Today, health related agencies such as the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (“CDC”) recognize that “[t]he concept of ‘domestic’ as 
distinct from ‘international’ health is . . . no longer germane to infectious 
diseases in an era in which commerce, travel, and ecological change are 
intertwined on a truly global scale.”13 Therefore, preventing the spread of 
disease is not simply a nation-by-nation concern. Globalization has 
launched international health related issues into the global political agen-
da.14 Due to advances in modern technology, it is possible to travel 
across the world in a few hours. In 2008, airplanes carried almost one 
billion people across international borders.15 Global travel contributes to 
the spread of infectious diseases,16 thus necessitating that public health 
problems be addressed at the international level. 
In addition, changes in political, social, and environmental factors in-
crease the development and spread of infectious disease on a worldwide 
level.17 For example, population growth leads to overcrowding in ci-
                                                                                                             
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1337–38 (quoting National Health Policy Forum, Emerging and Reemerg-
ing Infectious Disease: A Major Public Health Challenge, Issue Brief No. 686 (1996)). 
 14. Rosario M. Isasi & Thu Minh Nguyen, The Global Governance of Infectious Dis-
eases: The World Health Organization and the International Health Regulations, 43 
ALBERTA L. REV. 497, 499 (2005) (stating that “only a few urgent public health risks or 
emergencies remain solely within the purview of national or state authorities”). 
 15. World Tourism Org. (UNWTO), Testing Time for International Tourism, 
UNWTO WORLD TOURISM BAROMETER, vol. 7, no. 2 (June 2009) at 3, available at 
http://www.unwto.org/facts/eng/pdf/barometer/UNWTO_Barom09_2_en.pdf. 
 16. David P. Fidler, Mission Impossible? International Law and Infectious Diseases, 
10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 493, 494 (1996). 
 17. Allyn L. Taylor, Controlling the Global Spread of Infectious Diseases: Toward a 
Reinforced Role for the International Health Regulations, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1327, 1335 
(1997). 
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ties.18 Overcrowded and overpopulated cities create unsanitary living 
conditions, the type of environment in which diseases thrive.19 Political 
instability, which may force people to relocate, is another factor that 
causes diseases to spread because diseases are introduced into popula-
tions with no prior exposure.20 
On the international level, there is a lack of harmonization in how 
countries respond to the threat of infectious disease. Some of these res-
ponses, arguably, impinge on fundamental human rights. One basic hu-
man right is the right to health.21 “Under this positivistic human rights 
framework, government possesses an obligation, within the constraints of 
its resources, to provide an environment conducive to the public’s health 
and well-being.”22 However, the protection of both public health and 
other human rights are not always in harmony.23 For example, another 
basic human right is the freedom of movement.24 While quarantine me-
thods restrict the freedom of movement, it may be used in the interest of 
public health. 
According to the CDC, quarantine is defined as: “the separation and 
restriction of movement of persons who, while not yet ill, have been ex-
posed to an infectious agent and therefore may become infectious.”25 It is 
a method used to stop infectious diseases from spreading.26 While the use 
of quarantine may be useful in preventing the spread of disease, locking 
up an individual against his or her will may, in some situations, violate 
their freedom of movement. Therefore, there is an obvious friction be-
tween the right to health and the right to movement. In order to reduce 
this friction, the WHO should implement a multilateral agreement to en-
sure that quarantine measures may not be used until a certain level of 
emergency is reached.  
Part II of this Note discusses how the WHO has attempted to prevent 
the spread of infectious disease and the WHO’s International Health 
Regulations (“IHR”) on quarantine. Part III focuses on basic human 
rights analyzed in light of the use of quarantine. Part IV discusses some 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. at 1335–36. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & ZITA LAZZARINI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN 
THE AIDS PANDEMIC xiv (1997). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 3. 
 25. Fact Sheet on Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (May 3, 2005), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/isolationquarantine.htm 
[hereinafter Quarantine Fact Sheet]. 
 26. Id.; see also Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2002). 
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of the most recent global outbreaks of disease and how certain countries 
have responded, specifically focusing on the responses of the United 
States and China to the swine flu. Next, this Note offers advice on how 
international states can join together to help prevent the spread of disease 
while keeping in mind the basic human right to movement. Parts V and 
VI of this Note propose an agreement for the WHO to administer that 
follows the basic principles of the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”). The human right to health and the human right to movement 
may sometimes be at odds with one another, and this proposed frame-
work would ensure that both could be accomplished with as little friction 
as possible. 
The TRIPS agreement is a multilateral agreement that protects intellec-
tual property rights on an international level.27 The agreement sets out 
minimum standards of protection for each Member State, deals with the 
enforcement of these standards, and sets out dispute settlement proce-
dures for when these standards are violated.28 These aspects of a multila-
teral agreement are attractive because they help ensure that governments 
do not act arbitrarily, and if there is a violation of standards, there is a 
form of relief. It would be possible to use minimum standards to help 
mitigate the friction between the right to health and the right to move-
ment by including the point at which a violation of human rights is ne-
cessary or appropriate, mandating that the government must only impose 
on the right to movement when certain criteria regarding the disease and 
the country’s population are met. Criteria would include factors such as 
the percentage of population infected, the seriousness of the disease, or 
the rate at which the disease is spreading. 
An enforcement and dispute settlement mechanism is also necessary in 
order for a multilateral agreement, such as the one proposed, to work 
effectively. For example, if the school group from Maryland was quaran-
tined before certain factors or criteria were met in terms of the serious-
ness of the disease, then the United States could bring an action against 
China to a dispute settlement panel. If, on the other hand, the disease 
were serious enough for quarantine to be an available option, then the 
Chinese government would be permitted to act as they did. This would 
give individuals a sense of security because there would be proof that 
restorative measures are necessary due to the severity of the situation. 
                                                                                                             
 27. Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Overview]. 
 28. Id. 
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While quarantine methods may violate the right to movement, a Member 
State’s government would only be permitted to infringe upon this fun-
damental right when the situation is sufficiently severe to meet certain 
minimum standards. 
II. THE WHO’S ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM TO 
HELP PREVENT THE SPREAD OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
Due to the nature of contagious diseases and the way in which different 
countries are constantly interacting, there is a need for cooperation 
among countries to prevent the spread of disease.29 Before efforts were 
made on an international level to control infectious disease, the power 
lay entirely within each sovereign state.30 Efforts to create an interna-
tional system to help prevent the spread of disease began when the WHO 
was created. 
The WHO is a multilateral organization specializing in international 
health matters.31 It was established in 1948 when the International Health 
Conference adopted its Constitution, which was then signed by sixty-one 
states.32 The WHO “is responsible for providing leadership on global 
health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and 
standards, articulating evidence-based policy options, providing technical 
support to countries and monitoring and assessing health trends.”33 The 
WHO operates as a regulatory agency over nations.34 The organization 
has power, according to the WHO Constitution, to enact laws including 
“sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to 
                                                                                                             
 29. Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supernational Scale: Globalizing Ad-
ministrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1550 (2006). 
 30. David P. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases 
and International Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771, 795 (1997) [hereinafter Fidler, Emerging 
Infectious Diseases] (citing Sidney Edelman, International Travel and Our National 
Quarantine System, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 28, 28–30 (1963) (detailing early national responses to 
threat of disease)). 
 31. Allyn Lise Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work: A Legal 
Framework for Universal Access to the Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 
312 (1992). 
 32. Kathleen J. Choi, A Journey of a Thousand Leagues: From Quarantine to Inter-
national Health Regulations and Beyond, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 989, 1004 (2008); see also 
History of WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,  http://www.who.int/about/history (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2011). 
 33. About WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/about/en/ (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2011). 
 34. Etsy, supra note 29, at 1550. 
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prevent the international spread of disease.”35 Article 1 of the WHO 
Constitution states that “attainment by all peoples of the highest possible 
level of health” is a main objective.36 Article 2 states that the purpose is 
to “stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic, endemic, and oth-
er diseases . . . .”37 Article 2 further states that the organization’s duties 
include proposing regulations and agreements, and making recommenda-
tions in regards to international health.38 Thus, the organization has an 
extensive legal basis to develop international law.39 
In 1969, the WHO adopted the original version of the IHR.40 After the 
2003 SARS outbreak, the world’s governments recognized the need for a 
unified and coordinated system of defense against public health threats.41 
The IHR of 2005, which came into force on June 15, 2007, was a land-
mark for the WHO because it set out a new framework to detect and re-
spond to public health emergencies.42 The IHR defines its purpose as: “to 
prevent, protect against, control, and provide a public health response to 
the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with 
and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary inter-
ference with international traffic and trade.”43 
The IHR of 2005 drastically changed the notification requirements of 
States44 on health related matters.45 Previously, Parties were required to 
                                                                                                             
 35. Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 21(a), July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 
2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter WHO Constitution]; see also Etsy, supra note 29, at 
1550. 
 36. WHO Constitution, supra note 35, art. 1. 
 37. Id. art. 2(g). 
 38. Id. art. 2(k). 
 39. Choi, supra note 32, at 1005. 
 40. See International Health Regulations (IHR): Ten Things You Need to Do to Im-
plement the IHR, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/ihr/about/10things/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See World Health Org. [WHO], The International Health Regulations 2005: IHR 
Brief No. 1 (2005), available at www.who.int/ihr [hereinafter IHR Brief No. 1]. The pur-
pose of the IHR was to enhance national and global public health security. Id. 
 43. Global Alert and Response (GAR): Alert and Response Operations, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/csr/alertresponse/en/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
 44. “States” refers to WHO Member States and Non-Member State Parties who have 
agreed to be bound by the provisions. See WHO, The International Health Regulations 
(2005): IHR Brief No. 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/ihr/ihr_brief_no_2_en.pdf [hereinafter IHR Brief No. 2]. 
All countries which are Members of the United Nations may become members 
of WHO by accepting its Constitution. Other countries may be admitted as 
members when their application has been approved by a simple majority vote 
of the World Health Assembly. Territories which are not responsible for the 
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notify the WHO of cases of yellow fever, cholera, and the plague; now, a 
Party is required to report to the WHO any event that may be considered 
a “public health emergency of international concern.”46 Factors consi-
dered in making this decision include seriousness, unexpectedness or 
unusualness, significant risk of spreading internationally, and significant 
risk of international travel or trade restrictions.47 The purpose of this non-
disease specific notification requirement is to expand the IHR to include 
new risks so that public health emergencies can be detected early.48 Par-
ties are required to keep their surveillance systems49 for national health at 
a certain functional level and are required to inform the WHO of any 
evidence of health risks outside their own country that may cause a dis-
ease to spread.50 Under the IHR, the WHO may request information re-
garding activities within the country, and the country must respond in a 
timely manner.51 
III. THE USE OF QUARANTINE AS A METHOD TO PREVENT THE SPREAD 
OF DISEASE DESPITE POSSIBLE INFRINGEMENT ON THE HUMAN RIGHT 
TO MOVEMENT 
International human rights law promotes individuals’ rights against 
government negligence or intrusion throughout the world.52 The right to 
                                                                                                             
conduct of their international relations may be admitted as Associate Members 
upon application made on their behalf by the Member or other authority re-
sponsible for their international relations. Members of WHO are grouped ac-
cording to regional distribution (193 Member States).  
World Health Organization Countries, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/countries/en/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
 45. See IHR Brief No. 2, supra note 44. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Isasi & Nguyen, supra note 14, at 503. 
 48. IHR Brief No. 2, supra note 44. 
 49. Public health surveillance is used to control and/or prevent the spread of disease. 
Surveillance uses include “detecting epidemics, documenting the spread of disease, pro-
viding quantitative estimates of the magnitude of the morbidity and mortality, describing 
the clinical course of disease, identifying potential factors involved in disease occurrence, 
facilitating epidemiologic research, targeting resources for program intervention, and 
assessing control of prevention activities.”  Stephen B. Thacker & Ruth L Berkelman, 
History of Public Health Surveillance, in WILLIAM HALPERIN & EDWARD L. BAKER, JR., 
PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE 7 (1992). In recent years, computer software and hard-
ware began to make surveillance more efficient. Id. at 11. Large databases are more easi-
ly analyzed and allow public health professionals to organize, tabulate, and communicate 
data. Id. 
 50. See IHR Brief No 1, supra note 42. 
 51. See id. 
 52. GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 21, at 43. 
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health is fundamental, and the 1946 Constitution of the WHO states, 
“[t]he enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, re-
ligion, political belief, economic or social condition.”53 The preamble 
defines health as “a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-
being not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”54 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), adopted in 1948, was a first 
attempt at creating a standard on the international level to promote hu-
man rights.55 The basic principle of the declaration is that “[a]ll human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”56 The UDHR ad-
dresses the basic right to freedom of movement, and Article 13 claims: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the borders of each State. Everyone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his country.”57 The WHO’s Constitu-
tion acknowledges the basic human right to health,58 and since health is a 
human right, States have an absolute obligation to promote and defend 
that right.59 However, tension exists over how to enforce these rights on a 
national and international level.60 The outbreak of infectious disease 
creates situations in which governments may have to limit some human 
rights in order to ensure the human right to health.61 The WHO widely 
acknowledges that the exercise of fundamental rights, specifically free-
dom of movement, may be limited for reasons including public health 
and controlling the spread of infectious disease.62 
                                                                                                             
 53. WHO Constitution, supra note 35, pmbl. 
 54. Id. 
 55. GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 21, at 3; see Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
UDHR]. 
 56. UDHR art. 1. 
 57. GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 21, at 3; UDHR, supra note 55, art. 13. The 
WHO stated that any country bound by the Regulations may not refuse entry into its terri-
tory if a person fails to provide medical records stating that he or she does not carry the 
AIDS virus. GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 21, at 21. However, many countries have 
disregarded this regulation and prevent people from entering who either have, or who are 
suspected to have, the disease. Id. at 3. 
 58. “The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the funda-
mental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, 
economic or social conditions.” WHO Constitution, supra note 35, pmbl. 
 59. GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 21, at 28. 
 60. See id. at 32. 
 61. Lauren Z. Asher, Confronting Disease in a Global Arena, 9 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 135, 157 (2001). 
 62. Isasi & Nguyen, supra note 14, at 507. 
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The use of quarantine is problematic because it infringes upon a per-
son’s basic fundamental right to freedom of movement.63 Forced con-
finement under quarantine raises many human rights issues including: 
(1) discrimination against carriers of the disease; (2) the deprivation of 
liberty inherent in the imposition of public health measures without es-
tablishing that the person creates a significant health risk to society; (3) 
the failure to maintain the privacy of health information; and (4) the 
failure of governments to disseminate relevant public health informa-
tion.64 
Focusing on issue number two, it is clear that unless it is determined that 
a society is at risk, it is possible that the use of quarantine may lead to an 
unwarranted deprivation of liberty.65 
Dating back to as early as the sixth century, quarantine is one of the 
oldest tools used to protect individual states from the spread of epidem-
ics.66 Quarantine restricts the movement of persons who have been ex-
posed to an infectious agent and therefore may become infectious, al-
though have not yet become ill.67 In contrast, isolation is “the separation 
of persons known to have an infectious disease from others who are not 
infected, in order to reduce contact and stop the spread of illness.”68 
However, the two are often used interchangeably. Quarantine dates back 
to when authorities began to quarantine ships in order to prevent infected 
cargo and people from spreading the disease into the country of import.69 
By the nineteenth century, quarantine became a universal and widespread 
method of preventing the spread of disease, and Europe, Asia, and Amer-
ica all used quarantine in their seaports to prevent the importation of dis-
ease through trading.70 However, quarantine is infamous for poor treat-
ment and cruelty, as travelers “faced involuntary isolation based on arbi-
                                                                                                             
 63. See GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 21, at 3; see also UDHR, supra note 55, art. 
13. 
 64. Asher, supra note 61, at 158–59 (citing David P. Fidler, The Future of the World 
Health Organization: What Role for International Law?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1079, 1122 (1998)). 
 65. See Asher, supra note 61, at 158. 
 66. OLEG P. SCHEPIN & WALDERMAR V. YERMAKOV, INTERNATIONAL QUARANTINE 11 
(1991); see also Nola M. Reis, Infectious Disease: Quarantine and the Law: The 2003 
SARS experience in Canada (A New Disease Calls on Old Public Health Tools), 43 
ALBERTA L. REV. 529, 532 (2005). 
 67. LANCE GABLE ET AL., LEGAL ASPECTS OF HIV/AIDS: A GUIDE FOR POLICY AND 
LAW REFORM 23 (2007). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Reis, supra note 66, at 532. 
 70. SCHEPIN & YERMAKOV, supra note 66, at 24–25. 
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trary regulations and irrational fears in often unhealthy, degrading condi-
tions, sometimes reinforced by the threat of execution.”71 
Article 3 of the 2005 IHR states: “[t]he implementation of these Regu-
lations shall be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fun-
damental freedoms of persons.”72 Conforming with basic humans rights 
is therefore implicit within the execution of the entire IHR. Article 31 of 
the 2005 IHR deals with health measures relating to entry of travelers 
and states: 
If there is evidence of an imminent public health risk, the State Party 
may, in accordance with its national law and to the extent necessary to 
control such a risk, compel the traveler to undergo or advise the travel-
er, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 23, to undergo: (a) the least inva-
sive and intrusive medical examination that would achieve the public 
health objective; (b) vaccination or other prophylaxis; or (c) additional 
established health measures that prevent or control the spread of dis-
ease, including isolation, quarantine or placing the traveler under public 
health observation.73 
Therefore, under Article 31, a Member State may not arbitrarily force a 
traveler into quarantine. Only if there is an imminent public health risk 
may a Member State compel a traveler to be quarantined. However, this 
provision is not as helpful and beneficial as it may seem because a coun-
try can simply classify a situation as an “imminent public health risk” 
whenever it feels the need to do so. 
Article 32 of the 2005 IHR pertains to the treatment of travelers. It 
states: 
In implementing health measures under these Regulations, States Par-
ties shall treat travelers with respect for their dignity, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and minimize any discomfort or distress asso-
ciated with such measures, including by: (a) treating all travelers with 
courtesy and respect; (b) taking into consideration the gender, sociocul-
tural, ethnic or religious concerns of travelers; and (c) providing or ar-
ranging for adequate food and water, appropriate accommodation and 
clothing, protection for baggage and other possessions, appropriate 
medical treatment, means of necessary communication if possible in a 
language that they can understand and other appropriate assistance for 
                                                                                                             
 71. Reis, supra note 66, at 532; see also DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH: MATERIALS ON AND ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL HEALTH JURISPRUDENCE 289 
(2000). 
 72. WHO, International Health Regulations 2005, art. 3(1) (2d ed., 2005) [hereinafter 
WHO, IHR 2005], available at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf. 
 73. Id. art. 31(2). 
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travelers who are quarantined, isolated or subject to medical examina-
tions or other procedures for public health purposes.74 
While Article 32 is helpful in that it describes how travelers must be 
treated when compelling a traveler to undergo quarantine, it still does not 
address exactly when quarantine measures may be used. There must be 
an “imminent public health risk,”75 but there is no definitive explanation 
as to what that entails. 
Historically, the WHO has been less than aggressive in using its pow-
ers, failing to use its authority to the full extent.76 Generally, the WHO 
issues nonbinding recommendations rather than instituting regulations.77 
The regulations that were promulgated by in the IHR do not have much 
influence because of the WHO’s “contracting out” provision that allows 
states to opt out of legal obligations, if so desired.78 Therefore, Member 
States can easily escape liability if they are unwilling to follow certain 
regulations.79 
The government of the People’s Republic of China decided that the 
IHR would apply to the entire territory and did not utilize the “contract 
out” provision.80 In order to apply the IHR, the government had to revise 
the Frontier Health and Quarantine Law of the People’s Republic of 
China.81 The revision helped develop the capacity for rapid response to a 
public health emergency; it created the technology for the required sur-
veillance, reporting and notification of public health emergencies, and 
formulated an information-sharing device in order to implement the 
IHR.82 
The United States accepted the IHR as well, but with some reserva-
tions.83 It implemented the IHR in accordance with the United States 
Constitution, “to the extent that the implementation of these obligations 
comes under the legal jurisdiction of the Federal Government.”84 The 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. art. 32. 
 75. Id. art. 31. 
 76. Rebecca B. Chen, Closing the Gaps in the U.S. and International Quarantine 
Systems: Legal Implications of the 2007 Tuberculosis Scare, 31 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 83, 97 
(2008). 
 77. Id. at 98. 
 78. Id. at 98–99 (stating that “[t]his ‘contracting out’ provision was intended as a 
solution to the earlier problem of states’ inconsistent subscriptions to various laws under 
the treaty system”). 
 79. Id. at 99. 
 80. WHO, IHR 2005, supra note 72, app. 2. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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government “reserves the right to assume obligations under these Regu-
lations in a manner consistent with its fundamental principles of federal-
ism.”85 
Since both China and the United States have accepted these regula-
tions, both countries seem to respect dignity, freedom, and human 
rights.86 However, the regulations do not address the control of the 
spread of disease,87 nor do they provide the power to enforce com-
pliance.88 Disease continues to spread, regardless of state’s respect for 
human rights. 
IV. EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
Emerging infectious diseases (“EIDs”) are defined as “diseases of in-
fectious origin whose incidence in humans has increased within the past 
two decades or threatens to increase in the near future.”89 This includes 
new diseases that have never been identified before as well as previously 
known diseases that have resurfaced.90 Outbreaks of the HIV/AIDS vi-
rus, SARS, and most recently, the swine flu/H1N1 influenza resulted in 
the deaths of millions of individuals worldwide. 
A. Recent Outbreaks 
i. HIV/AIDS 
HIV/AIDS is considered one of the most destructive pandemics in re-
cent times, killing over twenty-five million people in the past twenty-five 
years.91 Currently, about thirty-three million people are living with the 
disease around the world.92 The virus attacks white blood cells, leaving 
the immune system significantly weakened so the body is unable to fight 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. David P. Fidler, Globalization, International Law, and Emerging Infectious Dis-
ease, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 77, 79 (1996). 
 88. Id. at 80. 
 89. Fidler, Emerging Infectious Diseases, supra note 30, at 778 (citing U.S. CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADDRESSING EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS: 
A PREVENTION STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES 1 (1994)). 
 90. Id. (citing WHO, World Health Report 1996: Fighting Disease, Fostering Devel-
opment 15 (1996)). 
 91. WHO, Office of U. N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Right to Health, at 
20 (June 13, 2008), available at  
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet31.pdf. 
 92. Id. 
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off infection.93 HIV can be transmitted through blood, semen, vaginal 
fluids, or breast milk.94 Transmission is possible through either intimate 
contact or sharing intravenous instruments.95 Countries have used qua-
rantine and restricted international travel in order to try to prevent the 
spread of the disease.96 Since it is now known that HIV does not spread 
via casual contact, the use of quarantine and restriction on travel has 
widely been abandoned.97 However, some countries still permit people 
infected with HIV to be isolated.98 
ii. SARS 
Cases of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”) emerged in 
2002 as the first new infectious disease to surface in the twenty-first cen-
tury.99 Symptoms of SARS typically include high fever, body aches, 
headache, and overall discomfort, and most patients develop pneumonia 
after a dry cough emerges.100 SARS is thought to spread from person to 
person by respiratory droplets produced when an infected person coughs 
or sneezes.101 The droplets can be propelled up to three feet onto anoth-
er’s mucous membrane of the mouth, nose, or eyes.102 
The mortality rate for SARS is about eleven percent.103 After the first 
human case was confirmed in November of 2002 in southern China, the 
government initially tried to contain information about the outbreak.104 
The disease then spread to Hong Kong, Vietnam, Canada, and Singa-
pore.105 According to the WHO, 8,098 people were infected with SARS 
during the 2003 outbreak.106 The SARS epidemic showed the world that 
                                                                                                             
 93. Andreas Schloenhardt, From Black Death to Bird Flu: Infectious Diseases and 
Immigration Restrictions in Asia, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 263, 274–75 (2006). 
 94. Id. at 275. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. GABLE ET AL., supra note 67, at 23. For example, in the Philippines, the AIDS 
Prevention and Control Act of 1998 § 37 explicitly prohibits using isolation or quarantine 
against those with HIV. Id. at 24. 
 98. Id. at 23. 
 99. Schloenhardt, supra note 93, at 277. 
 100. Fact Sheet: Basic Information About SARS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (May 3, 2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nciDOD/sars/factsheet.htm [hereinafter 
CDC, SARS Information]. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. It is also possible that the SARS virus is airborne spread, but this is not yet 
known. Id. 
 103. Schloenhardt, supra note 93, at 278. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 279. 
 106. CDC, SARS Information, supra note 100. 
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a highly contagious disease could spread over thousands of miles within 
hours.107 
In the countries most severely affected by the SARS epidemic, includ-
ing China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Canada, Taiwan, and Singapore, qua-
rantine and isolation were commonly used.108 In these countries, most of 
the hundreds of thousands of people who were quarantined voluntarily 
entered into home quarantine.109 For example, according to the CDC, 
only a small number of people in Canada required a legal order to coope-
rate with quarantine restrictions, and almost all of the people who were 
asked to follow quarantine restrictions willingly did so.110 In Toronto, 0.1 
percent of the individuals subject to mandatory quarantine were forced to 
comply due to mandatory orders.111 In Asia, resistance to quarantine met 
extremely harsh enforcement.112 For example, in China, individuals who 
resisted compliance with quarantine orders were threatened with impri-
sonment, death sentences, or being barricaded in buildings.113 
Since there was limited incidence of SARS in the United States during 
the 2003 outbreak, the CDC in the United States did not recommend the 
use of quarantine,114 nor did the CDC force anyone into isolation or qua-
rantine.115 However, the United States may not be so lucky the next time 
an epidemic breaks out. The SARS outbreak can be viewed as a wake-up 
call for countries to ensure proper preparation for the next crisis.116 In the 
wake of SARS, scholars have taken into consideration whether current 
laws and values in the United States would support using traditional pub-
lic health measures in an epidemic, including extensive quarantine meas-
ures.117 
                                                                                                             
 107. Mark A Rothstein, Are Traditional Public Health Strategies Consistent with Con-
temporary American Values?, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 175, 175 (2004). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 189. 
 110. Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Version 2, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (May 3, 2005), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/D/app2.htm. 
 111. Reis, supra note 66, at 531. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 531–32 (citing Mike Mitka, SARS Thrusts Quarantine into the Limelight, 
290 JAMA 1696 (2003). 
 114. Quarantine Fact Sheet, supra note 25. 
 115. Questions and Answers on Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 3, 2005), 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/quarantineqa.htm. 
 116. Reis, supra note 66, at 530. 
 117. See Rothstein,  supra note 107, at 175–76. 
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iii. Swine Flu/H1N1 Influenza 
The swine flu, or H1N1 influenza, was first detected in the United 
States in April of 2009.118 Symptoms typically include fever, cough, sore 
throat, runny nose, chills, fatigue, headache, and body aches.119 The 
swine flu spread worldwide, and on June 11, 2009, the WHO stated that 
a pandemic was underway.120 The pandemic alert level was raised to a 
Phase 6 due to the spread of the virus, not the severity of it.121 On Octo-
ber 24, 2009, President Obama declared the swine flu epidemic a nation-
al emergency in the United States.122 
                                                                                                             
 118. Questions and Answers: 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/qa.htm. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. WHO Pandemic Declaration: A Pandemic is Declared, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION,  http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/who/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
A flu pandemic occurs when a new influenza A virus emerges for which there is little or 
no immunity in the human population; the virus causes serious illness and spreads easily 
from person-to-person worldwide. About the Flu, FLU.GOV, 
http://pandemicflu.gov/individualfamily/about/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
 122. Press Release, President Obama, Office of the Press Sec’y, Declaration of a Na-
tional Emergency with Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic (Oct. 24, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/declaration-a-national-
emergency-with-respect-2009-h1n1-influenza-pandemic-0 [hereinafter Obama Declara-
tion of National Emergency]. The Declaration states in pertinent part: 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of 
America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the 
laws of the United States, including sections 201 and 301 of the National 
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) and consistent with section 1135 of 
the Social Security Act (SSA), as amended (42 U.S.C. 1320b-5), do hereby find 
and proclaim that, given that the rapid increase in illness across the Nation may 
overburden health care resources and that the temporary waiver of certain stan-
dard Federal requirements may be warranted in order to enable U.S. health care 
facilities to implement emergency operations plans, the 2009 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic in the United States constitutes a national emergency. Accordingly, I 
hereby declare that the Secretary may exercise the authority under section 1135 
of the SSA to temporarily waive or modify certain requirements of the Medi-
care, Medicaid, and State Children’s Health Insurance programs and of the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule throughout 
the duration of the public health emergency declared in response to the 2009 
H1N1 influenza pandemic. In exercising this authority, the Secretary shall pro-
vide certification and advance written notice to the Congress as required by 
section 1135(d) of the SSA (42 U.S.C. 1320b-5(d). 
Id. 
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By November 1, 2009, over 199 countries and territories reported con-
firmed cases of the H1N1 virus.123 During this time period, the United 
States experienced intense and ongoing transmission of the illness, which 
“continue[d] . . . without evidence of peak in activity.”124 In Europe and 
Asia, the transmission continued to increase across boarders.125 The 
WHO actively monitored the spread of the disease.126 China employed 
quarantine methods in attempt to stop the spread of the H1N1 virus.127 
However, some believed that this response was disproportionate to the 
threat.128 Since Chinese authorities are still criticized for not responding 
promptly enough during the outbreak of SARS in 2003, the authorities 
knew the importance of monitoring and accordingly responded powerful-
ly to the swine flu outbreak through quarantining.129 China’s response 
illustrated a clear difference in response tactics between China and the 
United States.130 
In the United States, factors such as “rugged individualism, self-
reliance, nonconformity, and independence are highly valued.”131 Since 
this is what American society is based upon, it does not seem as though 
such arbitrary isolation and quarantine measures similar to those taken in 
China would be as likely to occur in the United States. This is why a uni-
form set of minimum standards that clearly illustrates when a Member 
State may act in a way that violates the human right to movement is ne-
cessary. The WHO should use the TRIPS agreement as a guide to create 
this international standard, as the TRIPS agreement contains many of the 
same types of provisions that a successful international health agreement 
would require. 
                                                                                                             
 123. Global Alert and Response (GAR): Pandemic (H1N1) 2009—Update 73, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG.,  http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_11_06/en/index.html. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. McNeil & Lafraniere, supra note 3. 
 128. Id.; see also Bill Meyer, Swine Flu Quarantine: The Chinese Biohazard Suits 
Mean You Won’t Make it to the Wedding, CLEVELAND.COM (May 18, 2009),  
http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2009/05/the_chinese_biohazard_suits_me.htm
l (American tourists were forced into quarantine in a Chinese hotel room for seven days 
simply because their plane had a two-hour layover in Cancun, Mexico. They never 
showed any symptoms.). 
 129. McNeil & Lafraniere, supra note 3. 
 130. Rothstein, supra note 107, at 182. 
 131. Id. at 190. 
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V. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: A POSSIBLE GUIDE FOR CREATING A 
MULTILATERAL INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATION AGREEMENT 
The TRIPS agreement is a multilateral agreement that protects interna-
tional intellectual property rights.132 It has been called “the most ambi-
tious international intellectual property convention ever attempted.”133 
The TRIPS agreement does not require that all countries have identical 
rules on protection of intellectual property.134 Members are simply re-
quired to comply with certain minimum standards, and they may imple-
ment in their law more extensive protection if so desired, as long as these 
protections do not contravene the agreement.135 This creates a uniform 
minimum level of protection for intellectual property rights. It recognizes 
that there are different ways to protect intellectual property rights, but 
establishes a mandatory minimum level of protection that WTO mem-
bers are obligated to provide.136 
The TRIPS agreement also contains a national treatment standard, 
mandating that a Member State must accord the same protection to fo-
reigners as accorded to its own nationals.137 This encourages a system of 
non-discrimination because a WTO Member may not treat other WTO 
Members less favorably than it treats its own nationals with regard to 
intellectual property protection.138 TRIPS also contains a most-favored-
nation treatment standard.139 This means that Member States are required 
to give equal treatment to nationals of all trading partners in the WTO, 
and one partner may not be treated more “favorably” than another.140 
TRIPS Part III, the enforcement section, details the procedures and re-
medies that are available to rights holders in the event of violation.141 
The enforcement provisions are divided into five sections, including a 
“General Obligations” section, a section regarding civil and administra-
tive procedures and remedies, a section on border measures, and a sec-
                                                                                                             
 132. TRIPS Overview, supra note 27. 
 133. Rosielyn Alviar Pulmano, In Search of Compliance with TRIPS Against Counter-
feiting in the Philippines: When is Enough Enough?, 12 TRANSNAT’L LAW 241, 262 
(1999). 
 134. Frequently Asked Questions about TRIPS  in the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) 
[hereinafter TRIPS FAQ]. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Darya Haag, Time to Pay the Dues or Can Intellectual Property Rights Feel Safe 
with the WTO?, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 427, 436 (2009). 
 137. Pulmano, supra note 133, at 263. 
 138. Haag, supra note 136, at 437. 
 139. Pulmano, supra note 133, at 263. 
 140. Id. at 264. 
 141. TRIPS FAQ, supra note 134. 
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tion on criminal procedures.142 Article 41.1 states that “Members shall 
ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available 
under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of in-
fringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement.”143 
Enforcement procedures must be “fair and equitable” and may not be 
“unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits 
or unwarranted delays.”144 
In order to enforce requirements under TRIPS, the WTO’s Understand-
ing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(“DSU”) enables parties to bring a claim against another party in front of 
a “single unified nucleus” called the Dispute Settlement Body 
(“DSB”).145 The DSU describes a structured procedure for dispute reso-
lution under the WTO.146 After the DSB makes a decision and issues 
recommendations for action on the part of the parties, the DSU continues 
to observe the losing party’s steps to ensure compliance with the recom-
mendations.147 
It is evident that the drafters of the TRIPS agreement recognized the 
inherent difficulties faced by certain countries in implementing all of the 
TRIPS requirements. Therefore, TRIPS allows developing countries a 
longer transition period for bringing their legislation and practices into 
conformity with the TRIPS requirements than for developed countries.148 
Thus, all Members have time to ensure that they are complying with 
TRIPS before they can be brought to the DSB for failure to comply. 
These TRIPS concepts, while only relating to international intellectual 
property protection, may be analogized into the world of international 
health regulation in order to help prevent the spread of disease while li-
miting the amount of arbitrary and discriminatory violations on the right 
to movement. 
VI. A PROPOSED MULTILATERAL HEALTH AGREEMENT 
In order to eradicate epidemics and other diseases while respecting in-
dividuals’ basic human rights, complete cooperation with the proposed 
multilateral health agreement is vital. The WHO Constitution grants the 
                                                                                                             
 142. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 
Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 143. Id. art. 41. 
 144. Id. art. 41(2). 
 145. Haag, supra note 136, at 433. 
 146. Id. at 432. 
 147. Id. at 434. 
 148. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 142, art. 65. 
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WHO power to create quarantine requirements,149 and Article 3 of the 
2005 IHR states that its regulations must be read in compliance with hu-
man rights.150 Thus, the WHO has the power to introduce mandatory re-
quirements in relation to quarantine measures, though these requirements 
must comply with fundamental human rights. The WHO should exercise 
this power and not only ensure compliance with human rights but also 
help prevent countries from unfairly denying individuals their human 
rights. The WHO should implement specific and exact circumstances 
under which a Member State may infringe upon human rights by using a 
method such as quarantine. The WHO should implement an agreement, 
similar to the TRIPS agreement, including provisions that specifically 
describe types of minimum standards that all countries must follow when 
implementing quarantine measures. This proposed agreement should also 
have enforcement provisions similar to the provisions in TRIPS, and the 
WHO should create its own version of the WTO’s DSU where cases of 
agreement violations could be heard. Additionally, there should be a 
monitoring system to ensure that the recommendations made are com-
plied with, and if not complied with, then alternate remedies could be 
made available. The WHO should be more aggressive and use its au-
thority to the full extent. What purpose does an organization such as the 
WHO have if it does not utilize its power? 
The global society should be thought of as one entity, especially in the 
context of public health. In the United States, there are procedural and 
substantive due process requirements with regard to quarantine.151 If a 
government action impedes on a fundamental right, the courts apply 
strict scrutiny, and the action will be upheld only if it is “necessary to 
promote a compelling or overriding governmental interest.”152 However, 
in China, perhaps due to the SARS outbreak in 2003, the country was 
quick to act with their quarantine measures. Thousands of Americans 
were quarantined in the spring and summer of 2009 in China, and many 
American citizens feared travel to this part of the world.153 In the United 
                                                                                                             
 149. WHO Constitution, supra note 35, art. 21(a). 
 150. WHO, IHR 2005, supra note 72, art. 3. 
 151. See generally Michelle A. Daubert, Comment, Pandemic Fears and Contempo-
rary Quarantine: Protecting Liberty Through a Continuum of Due Process Rights, 54 
BUFF. L. REV. 1299 (2007). 
 152. Id. at 1314. 
 153. See Martia Cook, China Journal: My 4 Days in Quarantine, CBS NEWS (June 30, 
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States, federal law gives the President the power to declare a national 
emergency,154 a power that expands the government’s power and ability 
to impose restrictions on human rights. However, it is worth emphasizing 
that a situation calling for restrictions on human rights must be declared 
an emergency. The United States declared the swine flu/H1N1 outbreak 
a national emergency over a year after the first sign of the disease,155 and 
only then could measures such as quarantine be used. China, on the other 
hand, reacted quickly, and countless healthy travelers were subjected to 
quarantine measures. 
The great discrepancy in response time between China and the United 
States is evidence that more stringent and specific requirements are 
needed to streamline exactly when governments should be able to impose 
measures on individuals that violate their human rights. In certain situa-
tions, quarantine measures may in fact help prevent the spread of dis-
ease.156 Therefore, in order to strike a balance between preventing the 
spread of disease on both the national and international level, and pro-
tecting human rights, there must be a unified set of minimum standards 
that all countries must follow to justify an infringement on human rights. 
The minimum standards in this proposed agreement must be extremely 
specific, so that a Member State knows exactly when it is able to take 
actions that infringe upon individuals’ freedom of movement. A surveil-
lance system in each Member State is essential to creating a feasible 
agreement. Surveillance is “the systematic collection, analysis, interpre-
tation, and dissemination of selected health information.”157 Surveillance 
is necessary in order to monitor disease outbreaks. Since the 2005 IHR 
enhances surveillance and notification system requirements, the WHO is 
already capable of collecting the necessary data to determine when the 
infringement on the right to movement is warranted.158 However, with 
surveillance, especially mandatory testing and screening, comes issues of 
consent and privacy.159 While this may be the case, mandatory testing 
and screening may be a beneficial tradeoff because if Member States 
have accurate data, they are less likely to take unnecessary or arbitrary 
responses. Under the proposed agreement, all measures taken in response 
to a threat would be absolutely necessary to prevent the spread of the 
disease. 
                                                                                                             
 154. See 50 U.S.C. § 1621; see also HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
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 155. Obama Declaration of National Emergency, supra note 122. 
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Once a Member State has all of the data necessary, the Member must 
turn to the minimum standards provisions of the proposed agreement to 
ensure that the situation is a serious enough emergency that warrants li-
miting the right to movement. Vague phrases that have been used in the 
past, such as “an imminent public health risk,”160 must be given clear and 
precise definitions, as agreed upon by a panel of medical experts.  One 
key factor to be considered in determining the level of emergency is the 
percentage of the population already infected and in how long a period of 
time. This will give the Member State an accurate and realistic view on 
the severity of the disease and its contagious nature. Only once the sever-
ity and contagious nature of a disease reach a certain level, which will be 
determined by medical experts prior to the implementation of this pro-
posed agreement, may a Member use a method that impinges on the right 
to movement. Therefore, if this proposed agreement was in force during 
2009 when the Chinese government was quarantining thousands of fo-
reigners in fear of the swine flu, then China would be deemed to have 
violated the agreement if the severity did not meet the criteria necessary 
to use such measures. 
Additionally, the proposed agreement would include a provision that 
resembles the national treatment provision in TRIPS.161 This would help 
prevent the possibility of a country imposing irrational and discriminato-
ry quarantine measures against citizens of another country in fear that 
they are more likely to be carrying the disease. Upon learning that the 
first carrier of the swine flu was from Mexico, the Chinese government 
imposed far more disturbing measures against Mexican foreigners in 
China than any other known foreigner or national.162 This is not to say 
that the proposed provision would absolutely bar a Member State from 
using these measures if they were reasonable and justifiable. However, 
this flexibility would be clearly stated and described in the agreement. 
Additionally, the fact that Members could bring other Members to a dis-
pute settlement board for violating the agreement would deter Members 
from targeting certain foreigners without reason in fear of the repercus-
sions. 
                                                                                                             
 160. WHO, IHR 2005, supra note 72, art. 31. 
 161. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 142, art. 3 (“Each Member shall accord to the 
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While implementing a set of minimum standards may be difficult on 
Member States due to the fact that the efficiency of a country’s national 
health system is dependent on many factors, including political, social, 
and economic positions,163 the only actual requirement is the implemen-
tation of surveillance systems adequate enough to determine an accurate 
count of cases of a disease. Further, the proposed agreement will contain 
a provision similar to TRIPS Article 67, which encourages developed 
countries to assist developing and least-developed countries to comply 
by providing technical and financial aid.164 Developed members will be 
encouraged to assist developed and least-developed countries in order to 
get their surveillance systems in proper, working order. Also, as TRIPS 
has transition period provisions,165 the proposed agreement will also have 
a transition period to give Members the time needed to make the neces-
sary changes to their national surveillance systems. 
If individuals are assured that extreme measures will not be arbitrary 
and will only be used when completely necessary for the overall public 
good, then there will likely be less resistance when measures must be 
taken. Building trust between a government and its residents and visitors 
is essential to harmonize the protection of the concurrent rights to health 
and movement. Trust can be established by implementing a set of mini-
mum standards that all Members must follow to prevent arbitrary in-
fringement of human rights. Further, the enforcement mechanism would 
ensure that if these standards were to be violated, there would be reper-
cussions.166 
CONCLUSION 
There is friction between the right to health and the right to movement 
because in order to prevent the spread of infectious disease, it is often 
necessary to quarantine those who are ill or who have been exposed to 
the illness. In furtherance of balancing the right to movement with dis-
                                                                                                             
 163. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 7. 
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ease prevention, the WHO should implement a multilateral agreement 
containing sections that resemble certain provisions of the TRIPS agree-
ment. The proposed agreement should specifically state the level of 
emergency, as determined by a panel of medical experts, at which a 
Member State may use measures that infringe upon human rights, specif-
ically the right to movement, in order to prevent the spread of a disease. 
The level of emergency during which it would be acceptable to use me-
thods that infringe the right to movement through quarantine methods 
must be equivalent throughout all Member States so that certain coun-
tries do not deny human rights more arbitrarily than others. While it may 
take time to implement such an agreement, and while it may be difficult, 
this agreement is necessary in order to strike a balance between the right 
to movement and disease prevention. It will also create trust in the gov-
ernment if individuals know that their human rights may only be in-
fringed upon when necessary for the public good. 
The right to health and the right to movement are basic funda-
mental rights that every person in this world should be afforded 
with as little governmental restriction as possible. However, when 
government regulation is necessary for the greater public good, 
some basic rights may be sacrificed but only in a way that is uni-
fied throughout the world as governed by the WHO. This unified 
system would not allow human rights to be infringed until a certain 
level of emergency is reached, and if this proposed agreement had 
been in effect before the most recent swine flu outbreak, it is likely 
that significantly fewer people would have been forced into unne-
cessary quarantine throughout the world. This framework, if 
adopted, will help minimize the unnecessary and arbitrary in-
fringement of human rights going forward. 
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